Rediscovering Shared Values? EU-Serbia Relations after the 25th October

On October 25, Serbia witnessed a historic electoral turnout, resulting in the Student List winning a parliamentary majority with 53% of the vote and 140 seats in the Parliament. What makes this victory significant are not just the results, but rather the context in which they were achieved - years of unequal political competition, institutional and media capture, intimidation and repression that marked the rule of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and former President, Aleksandar Vučić. The historic voter turnout of 69%, similar only to the elections which ended the regime of Slobodan Milošević in October 2000, has not just secured the victory of the Student List, but also signalled the need to rethink the models of political participation. Such a significant result also requires a fundamental re-think of the EU’s approach to relations with Serbia, presenting the EU with some challenges but also a unique opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to its core democratic values.

First, who are the students? The Student List emerged from two years of mass student-led civic mobilization. The movement demanded accountability for the tragic collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy on November 1, 2024, which took the lives of 16 people. Following an attack on students and citizens during a commemorative gathering, students started blockades of major universities in Serbia. They began organising regular assemblies (plenums), based on direct democracy and horizontal coordination, demanding institutional accountability, investigation of corruption, and prosecution of those responsible.

Students' demands soon gathered mass support among citizens. Protests were organised in at least 400 towns and villages, while neighbourhood assemblies (zbor) emerged as a form of citizens' self-organisation, replicating the model of students' plenums. The months of protests were marked by increased government repression, pressure on universities, and continued targeting of students, activists, and journalists. As it became clear that the government would not fulfil the movement's demands, in June 2025 students formulated a new one: early parliamentary elections. 

Fast forward more than a year of protests and marches, cycling tours, local gatherings and initiatives organised by students, in the context of increasing repression, continual targeting and deepening political polarisation, former President Vučić announced elections. The Student List - a list of election candidates put together and endorsed by student plenums, campaigned for transparency and freedom of media, systemic changes in the judiciary, education, and economy. 

The programme states that the future government will prioritise fundamental reforms on the EU path and "will seek to obtain IBAR status through significant progress on the judiciary and fundamental rights, as well as on justice, freedom and security, the areas covered by Chapters 23 and 24". Yet, despite this, the students generally did not express their demands in the language of Europeanisation, reflecting the prior tenor of the relationship which was long dominated by a false dilemma between stability and democracy. 

On (In)stability

Since the SNS came to power in 2012, Serbia has experienced a gradual erosion of democratic institutions and political rights, transforming into an electoral autocracy. While the government maintained its declarative commitment to EU accession, and the EU maintained a declarative commitment to Serbia, governance of the process has been marked by limited transparency, weak parliamentary oversight and insufficient public participation. 

The persistent failure of the SNS-led government to implement reforms has jeopardised Serbia's access to EU funds under the Reform and Growth Plan, while the 2026 European Parliament Resolution on the EU Enlargement Strategy noted that the process has effectively stalled. The SNS-led government and pro-regime media continually spread anti-EU rhetoric, including verbal attacks on MEPs and attempts to discredit the accession process. Such challenges did not escape the notice of the Commission, who as recently as this year noted the negative impacts of backsliding in public administration reform, media freedom and freedom of expression, academic freedoms and autonomy of educational and cultural institutions, as well as Serbia’s undermining of regional cooperation initiatives.

Yet the EU persisted in supporting the government. Vučić was adept at mobilizing connections with leaders like Orbán in Hungary or Fico in Slovakia, as well as institutionalized connections with the EU through the SNS membership of the European People’s Party, to lobby for continued support. The geopolitical turn in EU foreign policy also provided opportunities such as with the EU’s support for the Jadar Valley lithium mine project, successfully opposed by mass protests demanding environmental justice and transparency.

On Democracy

Against this background, the student movement articulated demands for democracy, accountability and rule of law, reflecting the very principles underpinning the EU accession process. Yet, despite repeated appeals from students, academics, civil society organisations and public figures, the EU's response to the protests was slow and inconsistent. 

The students, however, offered a different model of governance.  At a time of declining trust in institutions, crises of democratic representation and growing autocratisation across Europe and beyond, students have shown that models based on direct participation and horizontal decision-making can challenge highly centralized and clientelist models. Based on these practices, the movement was able to transform widespread citizen dissatisfaction into mass mobilisation, sustained collective action and eventually, electoral change. The Student List has committed to represent these values during its mandate, based on principles of democratic governance, transparency, and accountability. 

Thus, the victory of the Student List presents the EU with a unique opportunity to reaffirm its values in an important partner country. Translating these shared values into the governance of Serbia’s EU accession process means a fundamental shift away from prior executive-dominated decision-making and closed political bargaining towards transparent, inclusive, and genuinely participatory policymaking. Such a transformation will require considerable time, political commitment and sustained effort, but it is essential to rebuilding institutional legitimacy, public trust and societal ownership of reforms. The initiatives that followed the electoral victory, like citizens coming together to clean parks, remove hate graffiti, and restore shared spaces, offer a glimpse of what this process could look like - with citizens reclaiming initiative and becoming actors of change and democratic restoration. All of which creates a rare moment for the EU to re-design its engagement around shared values to help build a stable and, this time, democratic Serbia.


Ivana Milićević is a Research Assistant at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (IFDT) and a PhD student of International and European Studies at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade. At the same Faculty, Ivana graduated in International Affairs and acquired her MA in Contemporary Balkan Studies. Her research focuses on regional and European integration in the post-Yugoslav space, emphasising the intersection of identity and foreign policy. She has been a 2026 BiEPAG Fellow at the Center for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz.

Alexander Mesarovich is a Research Fellow at the University of Stirling, a Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, Tirana, and at Comenius University, and a Visiting Fellow at the European University Institute. His research interests include the transnational populist radical right, EU accession, informal political networks, and EU external action. His work has been published in JCMS, Europe-Asia Studies, and ISQ among others and his monograph, Europeanization and Informal Political Networks in Southeastern Europe is available from Routledge.

The opinions expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of EU-VALUES Network.

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